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SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
COMMISSION’S PROPOSED
LAW
A survey done in 1992 shows that many
South African doctors have withheld or
withdrawn life-support from patients.
For example, most doctors surveyed stat-
ed that they would honour an advance
directive, such as a living will, that directs
withdrawal of life-support when a patient
is critically ill. Many responded that they
have willingly and actively participated in
terminating the life of a patient, e.g. by
issuing a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
order or withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining therapy.1
Although these practices are consistent
with widely accepted legal and ethical
principles,2 South African law does not
expressly permit doctors to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. Arguably, any act
that hastens an incompetent patient’s
death, even though consistent with the
patient’s earlier expressed preference, is a
violation of criminal law. No law or court
decision permits a doctor to honour a liv-
ing will or medical power of attorney
made when a now incompetent patient
was competent. The only South African
court to consider the issue refused to
recognise the legal validity of a living will
(Box 1). A large gap exists between the
law and ethically accepted actions routine-
ly performed by South African doctors.
In a groundbreaking effort to close this
gap, the South African Law Commission
(SALC) initiated a research project in
1992 and, after extensive public hearings,
proposed a new law.3 In response to wide
public support, the draft law would autho-
rise doctors to honour an advance direc-
tive (AD) — a living will or medical
power of attorney prepared by a patient,
now incompetent, at a time when the
individual was competent. The proposed
law also defines other circumstances in
which doctors may withdraw life-support,
and establishes a process by which doc-
tors must make these decisions. Finally,
the SALC proposes several options that, if
enacted into law, would legitimise volun-
tary active euthanasia performed by a
doctor at the request of a competent
patient (Box 2). Since 1998 the proposed
law has been in the hands of the Minister
of Health, who has the authority to for-
ward the draft law, or a revised version of
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the law: a new law for
South Africa?
There are a number of deficiencies in the draft
legislation regarding end-of-life decisions.
BOX 1
The patient was in a persistent vegeta-
tive state and had expressly declared in
a living will that he did not want to be
kept alive if he fell into this condition.
Although it refused to accept the living
will as legally binding, the court per-
mitted the patient’s widow to instruct
the doctors to withdraw life support on
the basis this would be in the patient’s
best interests. Clarke v. Hurste No and
Others 1992 (4) SA 630 (D).
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The SALC has taken an important
step by its proposal to recognise
patients’ living wills and medical
powers of attorney as legally valid,
and to set criteria by which doctors
and families decide when and
under what circumstances to with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment. Although the proposed
law has positive features (for exam-
ple, it adopts a definition of death
that includes ‘whole brain’ death)
and provides a process for decision
making, it contains ambiguities
and gaps that will create practical,
legal and ethical problems for doc-
tors, patients and families. Despite
these differences the draft law
should be advanced to Parliament,
where it can be publicly debated.
When that happens, the medical
community must become involved
to ensure that the new law takes
notice of the practical clinical reali-
ties of end-of-life decision making.
THE PROPOSED LAW IN A
NUTSHELL
Four parts of the draft law deal
with actions that would hasten
death. Two regulate end-of-life
decisions made by competent
patients, while the second pair gov-




First, competent patients 18 years
or older may refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment for any illness,
whether terminal or otherwise.
Second, and more controversially,
the proposed law provides several
options that would legitimise vol-
untary active euthanasia. Under
both options a competent patient
becomes eligible for euthanasia if
two doctors agree that he or she
has either:
• a ‘terminal’ illness (as defined
below) 
or 
• an illness that has no reasonable
prospect of being cured and
causes severe physical or mental
suffering ‘not reasonable to be
endured’ and
• ending the patient’s life is the
‘only way for the patient to be
released from his or her suffer-
ing’.
The first option that would permit
active euthanasia allows the patient
and a doctor to decide to end the
patient’s life without informing the
patient’s family. The second
option requires a patient to submit
a request, together with the doc-
tor’s findings, to a committee of
five, one of whom must be from
the patient’s family.
Incompetent patients: with or
without advance directive
Third, an individual may, when
competent, make an AD by signing
either:
• a living will that directs with-
holding or withdrawal of any
medical treatment when a patient
has a ‘terminal illness’, or 
• a power of attorney to appoint a
surrogate to make medical deci-
sions if the patient becomes
incompetent and ‘terminally ill’.
The draft law provides that an AD
may be honoured only if doctors
decide the patient cannot make or
communicate decisions and has a
‘terminal illness’ defined as either:
• persistent vegetative state (PVS),
or
• any condition that:
• will inevitably cause ‘untimely
death’, and
• causes the patient ‘extreme
suffering’.
Only after deciding to withhold or
withdraw treatment from an
incompetent patient must doctors
inform family members of their
findings. Doctors are not required
to consult with the family about
their decision or to take the fami-
ly’s views into consideration before
implementing the decision (cf. the
next section). This omission is
striking. Since ADs are often
vague, family members should be
allowed to provide evidence as to
what the patient really intended
and would want. Finally, the draft
law does not grant courts jurisdic-
tion to consider a family’s claim
that a doctor has wrongly inter-
preted the patient’s living will.
Fourth, if the incompetent patient
did not sign an AD that directs
this, a doctor may still grant ‘writ-
ten authorisation’ to terminate life-
sustaining treatment. The doctor
need only determine that the
patient is incompetent and suffers
from a ‘terminal’ illness as defined
above. However, if the family
objects, the doctor cannot imple-
ment his/her decision unless he/she
first obtains a court order.
Whether or not the patient has an
AD, the treating doctor must
obtain confirmation of the patient’s
condition from a non-treating doc-
tor, with expert knowledge, who
has examined the patient.
PROBLEMS WITH DRAFT
LAW
The proposed law would achieve
some important purposes.
However, as currently drafted, it is
BOX 2
This article does not assess the
legal, ethical and social prob-
lems that could arise if either of
these highly controversial
options authorising active
euthanasia were to become law.
For a comment that favours
adoption of the proposed
option, see Benatar D.
Euthanasia and assisted suicide:
the right to life and its corollary.
Specialist Med 2000; 22(6): 354-
358.
flawed in several significant ways:
• The draft law rigidly limits cir-
cumstances in which a living will
may be honoured by doctors.
• It allows doctors to make an ini-
tial decision to end a patient’s
life without consulting the
patient’s family.
• It overlooks legitimate reasons
for withdrawing treatment, e.g.
futility of treatment and limited
medical resources.
Unless these defects are corrected,
the proposed law will fail to
accomplish some of the most
important goals pursued by the
SALC and those who support
reform of the law.
Advance directives and patient
preferences may be ignored
Consistent with South Africa’s
Constitution and generally accept-
ed ethical principles, the draft law
allows competent patients to refuse
treatment for any illness. However,
the preferences of incompetent
persons, expressed when they were
competent, are not granted the
same validity. Although competent
persons may sign ADs directing
doctors to withdraw treatment, the
proposed law provides no guaran-
tee that doctors must honour their
clearly expressed desires once the
patient becomes incompetent. On
the contrary, doctors may with-
draw treatment only from a patient
who is in a PVS — the rare case —
or who faces an ‘untimely death’
and exhibits ‘extreme suffering’.
Vague terms such as ‘untimely’
death and ‘extreme suffering’ have
no accepted, quantifiable meaning
in medicine, particularly in the
context of incompetent patients
with chronic, life-threatening dis-
eases. Nor is it clear why interpre-
tation of a ‘terminal illness’ should
not, as is presently done, be deter-
mined by clinical judgement of
treating doctors.
Patients with serious chronic dis-
eases are encouraged to make a liv-
ing will or grant a power of attor-
ney. In these documents and pri-
vately to their families, individuals
often request that they not be sus-
tained by aggressive medical inter-
ventions if they become incurably
ill and lose their cognitive abilities
and/or basic physical functions. It
would be the unusual AD that
would meet the conditions of the
proposed law for withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment, i.e. that the
patient is in a PVS or afflicted with
‘extreme suffering’. Commentators
and courts have generally aban-
doned any notion that a patient
must exhibit suffering to qualify for
withdrawal of life-support.2
An unfortunate result of the draft
law’s narrow approach is that it
shifts the focus from the patient’s
preference for ending treatment —
the necessary beginning point for
any ethically acceptable decision to
honour an AD — to a process in
which doctors initially serve as the
main moral agents and decision
makers. The proposed law does
not require doctors to attempt to
understand the patient’s wishes, as
reflected in an AD and through
consultation with the family;
instead, it requires doctors to try to
fit the patient’s condition into the
draft law’s rigid, unrealistic defini-
tion of ‘terminal’ illness. This
could lead to a continuation of the
current unfortunate situation in
which the law diverges from uni-
versally accepted, ethically justifi-
able medical practice based on
respect for a patient’s autonomy
and dignity.
The draft law’s restricted, medical-
ly inappropriate definition threat-
ens to undermine one major goal
of the SALC: to authorise compe-
tent patients to direct their doctors
to withhold or withdraw unwanted
medical interventions once the
individual has become incompe-
tent.
Families are marginalised
The proposed law’s failure to
incorporate families into the deci-
sion-making process flows from its
erroneous view of the nature of a
decision to withhold or withdraw
aggressive treatment. The draft law
apparently envisions such decisions
as pure medical decisions that usu-
ally should be made — at least ini-
tially — by doctors alone. Given
this myopic view of the nature of
life-ending decisions, it is enough
that families are notified only after
experts have made their findings as
to the medical ‘facts’.
A decision to withdraw medical
treatment in order to allow an
incompetent patient to die is as
much a moral decision as a med-
ical determination. Doctors have
no special expertise in making
moral decisions for others or in
interpreting a patient’s intent as
expressed in an often vague AD.
To convert doctors into moral
agents to decide when to end a
patient’s life in circumstances of
ambiguity is to ‘medicalise’ these
decisions. Whenever possible,
decisions should be made jointly
by families, who are best acquaint-
ed with the patient’s values and
preferences for medical treatment,
and doctors who can provide accu-
rate medical information. In any
event, a doctor who decides
whether to continue or withdraw
an incompetent patient’s life-sus-
taining treatment must not act in
conscious ignorance of the family’s
wishes.
If the draft law is applied literally, a
family could claim no legal role in
a decision by a doctor to withdraw,
or refuse to withdraw, life-support
from a patient who has signed an
AD. Similarly, under one proposed
option to legitimise euthanasia
(when no committee is involved),
doctors would have no obligation
to inform a patient’s family of their
agreement to end the patient’s life
by administering a lethal agent.
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These decisions encompass value
judgements with profound implica-
tions not only for the patient and
the medical profession, but also for
the family and broader society. Yet
the decision to administer a lethal
agent could have been made, and
the patient could already be dead,
before the family learns of this.
Involvement by supportive family
could prove a critical safeguard to
a patient’s hasty or misconceived
decision or to an agreement by
doctors who lack information
about the broader context of the
patient’s circumstances.5 A law
that ignores the moral interests and
duties of patients and families —
and that relies only on doctors to
make what the draft law mistakenly
perceives to be solely ‘medical’
rather than moral decisions — is
bound to meet with strong resis-
tance.
The proposed law’s marginalisation
of the family is inconsistent with
widely held views, especially
among traditional South African
cultures, about the importance of
the family’s role in important deci-
sions made by a family member.6,7
There are, however, exceptional
situations in which doctors may
justifiably withdraw life-sustaining
interventions without obtaining
consent from either the patient or
family. Curiously, in these situa-
tions discussed below, the draft law
allows the family to override the
doctor’s decision to withdraw life-
support. As we will see, to permit a
family unilaterally to impose its
preference for continued aggressive
treatment in these exceptional cir-
cumstances raises a different set of
problems.
Medical resource allocation and
futility ignored
The draft law overlooks two com-
pelling factors that must be consid-
ered when deciding whether and
under what circumstances to with-
hold or withdraw life-support.
First, health resources are limited,
and not all patients can be provid-
ed the best, most expensive treat-
ments. Hospitals may adopt fair
and reasonable policies to select
which chronically ill patients are
entitled to scarce, life-sustaining
medical interventions that cannot
be provided to all who can benefit
(Box 3).
The proposed law makes no provi-
sion for withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment in order to comply with
validly adopted resource allocation
policies that seek to distribute
medical resources in a fair, efficient
and non-discriminatory fashion.
It allows doctors only to determine
whether the patient has a ‘terminal’
illness, as narrowly defined by the
draft law. If a patient has no AD
— and this is the usual case —
doctors may not withdraw even
from a patient who is in a PVS or
endures extreme suffering, if the
family objects. An ICU doctor who
proposes to withdraw life-support
under a hospital or government
resource allocation policy might be
faced with an objection from a
family. A cautious hospital would
be forced to bring a lawsuit in
order to determine whether it
could withdraw treatment, over the
family’s objection, from a patient
who is no longer entitled to it
under a resource allocation policy.
The resulting delay could signifi-
cantly undermine implementation
of fair and rational resource alloca-
tion policies of the kind approved
by the Soobramoney court (the ref-
erenced article provides an exam-
ple of such a policy)8. It remains
to be seen whether a court would
interpret the SALC law to permit
withdrawal of life-support for pur-
poses of implementing a rationing
policy, or whether families will be
allowed to reverse the effect of
such policies by objecting to with-
drawal, regardless of such consid-
erations.
The proposed law also ignores pos-
sible application of the familiar
concept of futility. Under the futil-
ity doctrine, doctors are not oblig-
ated to continue to treat patients
for whom treatment is futile, and
will merely extend biological life
without providing a cure or return
to meaningful existence.9 Both the
Clarke case (Box 1) and the UCT
statement2 recognise that treatment
that merely continues biological
existence, without providing a min-
imal quality of life that includes
meaningful communication, is
futile and need not be continued.
As drafted, the law takes no
account of this rationale for ending
treatment. Doctors are only per-
mitted to withdraw if they find that
the patient has a ‘terminal’ illness
in the narrow sense defined by the
law. A patient’s family could rely
on the draft law to demand treat-
ment for a patient who failed to
make an AD, even though all treat-
ing doctors deem further treatment
to be futile.
A court could interpret the law so
that it does not provide the exclu-
sive criteria for withdrawing life-
support, and allow introduction of
concepts such as ‘futility’ that are
well-recognised in medical ethics.
But it would be imprudent to
assume this. The better approach is
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BOX 3
The Constitutional Court
approved a hospital policy,
forced by shortages of funding,
equipment and personnel, to
limit dialysis for chronically ill
patients only to those eligible
for a kidney transplant. All who
failed medical criteria for a
transplant were denied life-sav-
ing dialysis.
Soobramoney v. Minister of
Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1)
SA 765 (CC)
to solve the problem before it
occurs and to revise the draft law
so that it recognises other well-
accepted rationales for withdrawing
and withholding aggressive medical
treatment.
CONCLUSION
The SALC recently opened a sepa-
rate investigation that could pro-
vide an alternative legal vehicle to
legitimise advance directives. The
new project focuses on the current
welter of laws that guide decisions
made by adults with diminished
capacity. Its goal is to produce
coherent, uniform standards for
decision-making on behalf of per-
sons who are medically and legally
incompetent to make important
judgements about their lives.
Unfortunately, the SALC has
announced that it will exclude
medical decisions made on behalf
of incompetent patients from its
investigation — including decisions
made at the end of life — because
this topic was addressed in its pro-
posed end-of-life law still pending
before the Minister of Health.10
Since no action has been taken on
that proposal, the SALC should
now take the opportunity to incor-
porate an improved version of
widely supported features of the
draft end-of-life law into a pro-
posed law on diminished capacity.
This should include clauses that
would authorise living wills and
medical prowers of attorney.
Euthanasia options could be left
behind to suffer whatever fate the
Minister of Health has in mind for
them. Without the politically sen-
sitive baggage of these options,
other portions of the end-of-life
law that attracted wide public sup-
port would gain a new lease on life
and a chance of enactment by
Parliament.
The SALC expects to publish a
discussion paper early in 2003, and
the public will be given a chance to
respond. The medical community
should support a proposal to incor-
porate portions of the end-of-life
law that would authorise ADs, and
other uncontroversial clauses, into
newly drafted diminished capacity
legislation. This may be the best
opportunity to bring some light
into the dark corners in which end-
of-life decisions are now made.
SALC project documents and contact information
for SALC staff can be found at http://wwwserv-
er.law.wits.ac.za/salc/salc.html.
References available on request.
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IN A NUTSHELL
A gap exists between ethical end-
of-life decisions and the law.
Terminating life-support could vio-
late the law.
The South African Law
Commission has submitted pro-
posals to reform the law.
It is proposed that living wills and
powers of attorney be legitimised.
The draft law prescribes the
process for ending life. 
Problems with the draft law:
• incompetent patients’ wishes
might be overridden
• families could be marginalised 
• ethical reasons for ending life
support could be ignored.
Reform can be accomplished
through another vehicle.
SINGLE SUTURE
Treating alcoholism: no magic bullet 
The FDA-approved naltrexone for treatment of alcohol dependence is based on proven efficacy in randomised trials.
Nevertheless, questions remain about the importance of clinical setting, patient characteristics, and concomitant
therapies in determining naltrexone’s effectiveness. Researchers from the US  Department of Veterans Affairs studied
naltrexone (given daily for 3 or 12 months) in a large, multicentre, placebo-controlled trial that included 627 veter-
ans with alcohol dependence. All subjects received counselling based on the tenets of Alcoholics Anonymous, initially
weekly and then monthly (N Engl J Med 2001; 345:1734-1739 and 1770-1771). At 13 weeks, there was no signifi-
cant difference in return to heavy drinking. At 1 year, there were no significant differences in percentage of drinking
days or number of drinks per drinking day. In the 2 naltrexone groups, medication adherence (percentage of days
that the medication bottle was opened) was 72% at 13 weeks and 43-44% at 1 year. Medication adherence, atten-
dance at counselling, and AA participation were associated with improved outcomes, regardless of treatment 
assignment.
Richard Saitz, MD, MPH writing in Journal Watch 4 January 2002, says that editorialists point out that, in this study,
naltrexone was ineffective in a population that comprised mainly men who had long-standing alcoholism and rela-
tively little social support and who received minimal counselling; these patient characteristics contrast with those in
prior studies that demonstrated naltrexone’s efficacy. Can naltrexone cure alcoholism? Clearly, the answer is ‘no, not
alone’, and we shouldn’t expect that any one drug could cure a complex, chronic medical illness. Nonetheless, the
current results do not negate previous findings of modest efficacy when the drug is used with appropriate counselling
in less severely affected patients.
